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ABSTRACT 
A shielded cask is used to transport radioactive materials between facilities at the Idaho National Laboratory.  The 
cask was fabricated with an outer and inner shell of A36 carbon steel with lead poured in the annular space between the shells 
to provide radiation shielding.  Carbon steel is known to be susceptible to low-temperature brittle fracture under impact 
loading.  This paper will present the analysis results representing postulated transportation accidents during on-site transfers
of the cask at subzero temperatures.  The accident scenarios were based on a series of cask drops onto a rigid surface from a 
height of 1.83m (6 ft.) 
Finite element models of the cask and its contents were solved and post processed using the ABAQUS software.  
Each model was examined for failure to contain radioactive materials and/or significant loss of radiation shielding. 
Results of these analyses show that the body of the cask exhibits considerable ruggedness and will remain largely 
intact after the impact.  There will be deformation of the main cask body with localized brittle failure of the cask outer shell
and door structure.  The cask payload outer waste can remains in the cask but will experience some permanent plastic 
deformation in each drop.  It will not be deformed to the point where it will rupture, thus maintaining confinement of the can 
contents. 
INTRODUCTION
The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), uses a shielded cask for 
intrasite transport of radioactive materials between buildings inside the facility.  The facilities operate year round, dictating
that some transfers take place in the cold Idaho winter.  For safety reasons, transfers do not normally occur during extreme 
cold weather; however, an equipment failure could leave the cask exposed to subzero temperatures.  Major components of the 
cask were fabricated using A36 carbon steel, which is known to be susceptible to brittle fracture under impact loading at low 
temperatures.  This paper demonstrates that brittle fracture resulting from a transportation accident will not prevent the cask
from performing its necessary functions of providing radiation shielding to nearby personnel and confinement of the 
radioactive payload inside the outer waste can. 
Description 
The HFEF-14 cask is essentially a cylinder with an inner chamber (Fig. 1).  The outside and inside shells of the cask 
are 9.5 mm (3/8 in.) and 6.3 mm (1/4 in.) thick carbon steel respectively.  The interior portion of the cask is filled with lead
cast in place.  The 25.4 mm (1 in.) thick top lid of the cask is bolted to the 38.1mm (1-1/2 in.) thick upper ring with eight 19.0 
mm (3/4 in.) diameter grade 5 bolts.  The bottom door is also a weldment with 9.5 mm (3/8 in.) thick carbon steel outside 
shells and a 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) thick bottom plate.  This door is 133.3 mm (5-1/4 in.) thick and rolls in and out of the cask like
a drawer on rollers.  The lower door is held in place during shipping with two 25.4 mm (1 in.) diameter grade 5 bolts.  The 
lower door rolls over a door support structure and out through a removable door support.  The door support structure is 
fabricated from 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) thick carbon steel as is the removable door support.  The door support is attached with four 
12.7 mm (1/2 in.) diameter grade 5 bolts to the door support structure. The cask has two lifting lugs near the top of the cask.
The cask also has 3 equally spaced support lugs which are used to support the cask in a fixture during transportation or 
storage.  The cask dimensions and weight are given in Table 1. 
Material Considerations 
The cask is primarily fabricated from various thicknesses of A-36 steel.  For this analysis the actual Certified 
Material Test Report (CMTR) was used for yield strength, tensile strength and elongation when available.  Minimum 
specified strengths were used for all other materials.  All steels use a modulus of elasticity (E) of 206.8 Gpa (30 x 106 psi) 
and poisson’s ratio (ȝ) of 0.29. 
The lead used for this analysis has a yield strength of 17.2 Gpa (2500 psi) and an ultimate strength of 22.9 Gpa 
(3325 psi) [1] with no limit on the strain.  The density of the lead was adjusted to bring the cask to the required weight 
Plain carbon and low alloy steels typically have body centered cubic (BCC) lattice structures.  BCC are known to 
lose impact resistance with decreasing temperatures and have increased risk of brittle failure [2].  Without a sample of the 
cask materials, and in the time available, the ductile-brittle transition temperature could not be exactly determined. Therefore
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Figure 1.  Cutaway view of the HFEF-14 cask showing various features. 
Table 1.  Cask Dimensions 
Cask Dimension/Weight Value
Outside diameter 0.84 m (33 in) 
Inner diameter 0.58 m (23 in) 
Height 3.71 m (146 in) 
Gross weight 14,130 kg (31,150 lbf) 
Outer shell thickness 9.5 mm (3/8 in.) 
Inner shell thickness 6.3 mm (1/4 in.) 
Other plate thickness (typical) 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) 
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Accident Scenarios 
The cask is transferred at speeds of 16.1 km/h (10 mph) or less, using a large 20 t forklift with a C-frame to raise the 
cask clear of the ground.  Operating procedures keep the center of gravity (cg) of the cask within 1.83 m (6 ft) of the travel 
path surface.  The travel path of the cask traverses asphalt pavement, rock and gravel roadways, compacted soil, and the 
concrete aprons in the immediate vicinity of the facility buildings. 
The accident scenarios assume that the cask will fall from a maximum height of 1.83 m (6 ft) and impact on concrete.  
Four orientations were selected to represent the impacts that would most severely damage the cask components or the 
payload in the waste can. 
1. Cask in a vertical orientation impacting on the flat bottom. 
2. Cask in a tilted orientation impacting on a bottom edge with the cask cg over the impacting bottom corner. 
3. Cask in a horizontal orientation impacting on its side. 
4. A 1.01 m (40 in.) side drop on a 152 mm (6 in.) diameter steel pin at an unreinforced location 
If the cask is dropped, the horizontal velocity will cause the cask to skid along the concrete, asphalt or gravel.  The 
horizontal deceleration would be small compared to the vertical deceleration arising from the impact.  This would not be true 
if the cask was dropped near a massive structure that would act as a rigid body and rapidly decelerate the cask horizontally.  
This is not a plausible event considering how the cask is transported and the facility layout. As damage arising from the 
decelerations from 16.1 km/h (10 mph) horizontal velocity is expected to be relatively minor, they were not included in the 
analysis.
None of the accident scenarios examine how well the cask resists penetration.  Although not required by site 
conditions, a 1.01 m (40 in.) side drop onto a 152 mm (6 in.) diameter rigid pin [3] at an unreinforced location on the cask 
was added.  This was a precaution against unforeseen puncture events such as by the forklift. 
The cask must provide two functions to satisfactorily survive these events.  (1) Since the shielded cask itself is not 
sealed, the outer waste can must undergo the impact without tearing or breaching in order to ensure that radioactive contents 
do not escape to the environment.  (2) The cask must also maintain its gross geometry well enough to provide adequate 
shielding to nearby personnel and keep the waste can captive inside the cask. 
Finite Element Model 
A finite element model of the cask was created using the I-DEAS 12 NX [4] software and translated into an 
ABAQUS/Explicit [5] input file. 
The cask was modeled using brick elements for the lead and then coated with shell elements for the inner and outer 
low carbon steel shell elements.  Typical element length is about 32 mm (1.25 in.).  The doors were modeled using the same 
method.  It was also assumed that the lead and steel plates were bonded.  This assumption simplified the creation and of the 
finite element model and reduced the solution time.  This simplification was judged to have a small influence in the outcome 
of the analysis because the damaged shell elements will be removed from the analysis when it would begin to make a 
difference whether they were bonded or not. 
The outer can was modeled with thin shell elements with their density increased to account for the weight of the 
contents.  This is conservative in that the stiffness of the contents does not add to the strength of the outer can.  Also, all the 
energy will be absorbed by the can and not the contents.  However, larger than actual deformation of the outer can is 
expected when using this technique. 
Failure of the outer layer of carbon steel was defined in the ABAQUS/Explicit model as tensile failure for brittle 
materials.  The cutoff stress was defined as Vy/3 per the discussion in the ABAQUS Theory Manual [6].  This failure theory 
(tensile failure) assumes failure when the pressure stress component is higher than the cutoff stress.  This means that there is
no plastic behavior in this material and when the cutoff stress is used, failure occurs when Vy is reached.  This model was 
chosen because it more closely represents the brittle behavior of the outer steel shell.  Failed elements were removed from the
finite element model. 
Welds were included in the model where the baseplate is attached to the cask and also where the lifting plate is 
welded to the cask.  These welds are modeled with thin shell elements with the shell thickness equal to the fillet weld throat 
length. 
The 28.8 mm (1-1/8 in.) door bolts were modeled as circular beams with a radius of 12.517 mm (0.4928 in.), which 
is the radius of the thread stress area.  These beam elements were monitored during the analysis to determine whether or not 
failure occurred. 
ABAQUS/Explicit general contact was used to simplify the contact for this analysis 
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ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Paper length constraints preclude the detailed discussion of all impact scenarios analyzed.  However, the side bottom 
corner case is used to illustrate typical results for all analysis cases.  Summaries of the other case results are presented 
following the bottom corner drop case. 
Side Bottom Corner (Typical results) 






Figure 2.  Cutaway view of the drop configuration for the side bottom corner drop. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the energy expended during the drop and the displacement of selected model nodes, 
respectively.  Plastic strain in the elements in the vicinity of the impact is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 3.  Energy expended during the bottom corner drop drop. 
Figure 6 shows the door bolts have failed by the end of the analysis.  The damaged elements have been removed and 
do not contribute their strength to the model after they have failed.  Figure 7 shows the strain in the outer can, which does not 
predict failure or breaching since the plastic strains are very low (6.2%). 
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Figure 4.  Displacement of various nodes during the bottom corner drop. 
Figure 5.  Cut away view of the plastic strain in the elements at the end of the bottom corner drop. 
Figure 6.  Plastic strain in the door bolts at the end of the analysis of the bottom corner drop.  Note the elements 
removed after failure. 
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Figure 7.  Plastic strain in the outer can from the bottom corner drop. 
Other Results 
Results from the side impact (Fig. 8) show that the top lid bolts fail, allowing the lid to separate from the cask.  Also, 
the remnants of the door structure are shown after their brittle failure.  Figure 9 shows the indentation of the side drop on a
rigid post.  The lead is not punctured by this drop and the cask integrity is maintained. 
Figure 8.  Flat side drop showing the lid separated from the cask and the shattered door structure elements. 
Figure 9.  Results of a side impact on a post. 
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Figure 10 shows the indentation of the outer can by the side post drop.  This distortion may make it difficult to 
remove the outer can from the cask, but it is not breached and maintains it seal. 
Figure 10.  Indentation of the inner can from the side impact on a rigid post. 
CONCLUSIONS 
These drop scenarios show that the cask outer shell and other support structures are damaged and may shatter during 
the various drops, but the outer can is still shielded in the cask.  The door always remains in place during the drops and does
not show any indication of coming out of the cask.  The damaged structures surrounding the door may assist in keeping the 
door in place.  The top lid does come loose during the front drop and separates from the cask.  The outer can experiences 
plastic deformation and strain during the drops, but does not strain enough during any drop to indicate that a breach occurs in
the outer can.  The outer can always stays within the confines of the cask. 
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